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Introduction
'Suicide' as a term is only 300 years old, but as a
practice it is likely as old as our species. It would be
prudent to begin with some of the views of our
predecessors. Socrates argued that people should not
take their own lives but did allow for exceptional
circumstances. Believing he had received a divine
sign he chose death over exile when his work in
Athens was done. The Stoics, especially the late
Stoics, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, believed
that a person always continued to live by his own
consent, and this was understood as a part ofhuman
freedom. Jewish opposition to this Greek and Roman
tradition was expressed by the first century Governor
of Galilee, Josephus Flavius, who forbade his troops
to commit suicide following a military defeat. The
early Christian church, born in a time of Jewish
apocalypticism and Platonic dualism, faced the
problem ofnew converts who engaged in reckless self-
destructive acts to escape the sins of this world in
order to embrace, all the sooner, the bliss ofthe next.
It was in this context that the classical Christian
prohibition of suicide was devised by Augustine of
Hippo. He interpreted suicide as forbidden under the
commandment against killing. He also portrayed the
examples ofRoman suicide, such as Cato the Younger,
as vain and cowardly. It was Augustine who gave
definitive expression to the theological trump card on
suicide still being played: the belief that this present
life is a Providential test of spiritual worthiness 2.
Killing oneself is, then, an avoidance of divinely-given
responsibility, a refusal to complete the qualifying
exam for the afterlife.
Thomas Aquinas added three arguments to the
theological prohibition of suicide. He portrayed it as
contrary to the charity one owes to oneself, a shirking
of the duties one owes to society, and a usurpation of
the prerogatives of God3. It is largely in opposition
to Aquinas, or perhaps some eighteenth century
Calvinist who knew Aquinas, that David Hume
seemed to direct his arguments. Montaigne is the first
in a line of continental dissenters from Christian
orthodoxy on suicide, followed notably by Montesquieu
and Voltaire. Montesquieu asserted that suicide does
not disturb divine Providence any more than other
interventions into nature, such as changing the course
of a river. Hume developed Montequieu's argument,
and those of the Stoics, that if the disposal of
human life were left to the Almighty, any action to
avoid death would be an infringement on divine
sovereignty.
If I turn aside a stone which is falling on my head I disturb
the course ofnature and invade the peculiar province ofthe
Almighty by lengthening out my life beyond the period,
which, by general laws of matter and motion, he had
assigned to it4 (p 583).
Rather than see suicide in opposition to divine
Providence, Hume believed it could well be in accord
with it.
When I fall upon my sword, therefore, I receive my death
equally from the hands of the Deity, as if it had proceeded
from a lion, a precipice, or a fever4 (p 584).
Hume rightly observed that, once we begin to interpret
actions as expressions of divine will, there is no more
reason to exclude suicide than to exclude diseases or
accidents. If Providence guides some causes, why not
all? Hume reasoned that
whenever pain and sorrow so far overcome my patience as
to make me tired of life, I may conclude, that I am recalled
from my station, in the clearest and most express terms4
(p 585).
Regarding Aquinas' argument that there is a social
obligation to continue living, Hume replied:
A man who retires from life does no harm to society, he only
ceases to do good; which, if it is an injury, is of the lowest
kind . . . and where my life is a positive burden to society,
my withdrawal from it is not only innocent but laudable4
(p 585).
Assisted Suicide
The orthodoxy about suicide in the late twentieth
century is not, however, centred on issues or sin,
nobility or freedom, but on psychiatric categories.
The psychiatric picture of suicide portrays it as a
despairing act, one carried out under a cognitive
disability or depression. Suicidal acts are symbolic
cries for help. I do not deny the appropriateness of
psychiatric interpretation, only the presumption
that it is all-encompassing. If either theological or
psychiatric categories are thought to exhaust the
possibilities for interpreting voluntary death, then
questions of physician-assistance are moot. I will
proceed, without giving full arguments, under the
assumption that suicide remains a reasonable
possibility, however exceptional. That is, at least some
acts of suicide are neither sins nor signs of illness,
and reflect a legitimate human option for how life
should end.
If suicide can be made comprehensible, or rational
from the patient's perspective, then we must entertain
as a serious ethical question whether doctors should
assist. I want now to look at some of the most
important arguments for and against, beginning
with the objections and then examining the counter-
arguments5.
(1) Physician assistance in suicide, some argue, is
forbidden by medical ethics. Physicians should never
be involved in causing death. The Hippocratic Oath
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states 'I will neither give a deadly drug to anyone if
asked, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect'.
Some physicians and ethicists see a physician's
assistance in suicide as morally equivalent to
euthanasia. The counter-argument is that assisted
suicide and active euthanasia sometimes look very
similar, and sometimes do not. They look more similar
in the Kevorkian-type 'assists' in which the physician
provides a special machine, hooks the person up
and supervises the procedures to assure the desired
result. They look very different in cases where the
physician provides information, or a prescription to
a patient, as in the actions of Dr Timothy Quill6.
Moreover, the prohibition against killing is not the
only medical ethical norm, and arguably not the most
important one in all situations.
(2) A second line of argument is based on the
conviction that suicides among the terminally ill are
a failure of the health professions and the humanity
of society. The wish to kill oneself, some argue, stems
from the fear of medical overtreatment, ofbeing kept
alive too long and against one's will. People turn to
suicide because good palliative care is lacking and
physicians are too aggressive with treatments. The
answer to suicide assistance requests, then, should
be more restraint and something like hospice care.
This argument is powerful, if not finally compelling,
because end-of-life care, at least in the USA, is too
often devoid of proper palliation and emotional and
spiritual support, not to mention being financially
burdensome. A great deal needs to be done on this
front. Yet this second line ofargument is too simplistic
and monolithic a response to a complex human
predicament. Perhaps many requests from patients
could be prevented by physician restraints and good
hospice care, but many others would not.
(3) Third, and most troubling, there is the slippery
slope objection and the idea that, ifphysician-assisted
suicide becomes morally and legally permissible, it
will inevitably lead to less discriminate acts involving
voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. To contemplate
physician involvement to any degree is to gaze into
the moral abyss. Slippery slope arguments come in
two forms, a logical argument and an empirical
one. The logical argument says it is impossible
to distinguish, morally, between physician-assisted
suicide and active euthanasia, that they are in essence
the same. There are no logical stops down the slope,
no resting points that reason can find compelling.
The empirical argument holds that logical distinctions
are irrelevant; the issue is about-what will happen,
not how carefully doctors or legislators devising laws
can reason. So even if slippery slope thinking is logical
or fallacious, it may still be an accurate description
of our practices. The world is, after all, not governed
by logic. Physician assistance in suicide, which might
be acceptable in a few cases, could unlink the safety
net which restrains us from a more wholesale
disregard for life to which our species is already prone.
The empirical side of the slippery slope is the one
which gives me the most need to pause, yet it can be
studied. On balance I feel that the benefits from
changing policies to permit physician assistance in
suicide in carefully specified cases outweigh the risks.
The deficits of the current arrangements prohibiting
physician assistance are substantial. Covert actions
are more susceptible to abuse than overt ones, and
hiding actions discourage communication among
physicians, patients, families and colleagues. Such
communication should be a formidable check on over-
stepping well-specified boundaries. Moreover, laws
which prohibit any form of physician assistance
enlarge the power physicians have over patients, but
without enlarging the benevolent potential in the use
of that power7.
Conclusions
It is often said that physicians must seek the high
moral ground. I agree with this but I worry that the
high ground will simply be identified as continuing
the moral injunction against assisting in death in any
way, rather than a more realistic stance. The desire
for a high ground, free of moral ambiguity, is likely
to get us into trouble, because it will be out of
touch with clinical realities and patient experiences.
Montaigne said that if we seek ethical certainty we
will fail, and that our too-lofty aspirations may blind
us to the true nature of our practices.
Two things I have always observed to be in singular accord
supercelestial thoughts and subterranean conduct ... there
is no use our mounting on stilts, for on stilts we must still
walk on our own legs. And on the loftiest throne in the world
we are still sitting only on our own ruMp8.
Fortune will not provide many of us with the quiet,
dignified, inexpensive death at home that resides in
our ideals. Some of us will be caught in situations in
which we are overwhelmed not simply by a terminal
illness, but by intractable suffering, severe disability,
progressive dementia, loss of financial means and
absence of a convivial order - friends, family and
colleagues who can console us in our losses. Most
horrifying, our dying can also burden our progeny,
drastically altering their life prospects even after we
are gone. Many of us might think this a fate worse
than death by our own hand.
Though I cannot claim to have made the case,
I believe one can be made for physician assistance;
one that does not devalue the disabled orterminally ill,
question the needfor hospice, andweakenthe traditional
prohibition against killing. I note that the UK
Institute of Medical Ethics Working Party Statement
on Assisted Death generally agrees with this assess-
ment9. In the effort to fomulate such a case, devise
principles and assist in enacting laws, medical leadership
would enhance the public trust in medicine. Physicians
are inevitably involved in the management of death,
the timing, style, and values involved in deciding how
our lives will end. To be committed to only one vision
about a good death is a too limited ethic, and medicine
will embrace it at a cost in public confidence.
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